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Abstract
Possible worlds’ semantics for modal logic has proven to be theoreti-
cally useful. But talk of possible worlds is puzzling. After all, what are 
possible worlds? This essay provides an overview of two of the main 
theories on the nature of possible worlds, namely, Lewis’s Extreme 
Realism and Plantinga and Stalnaker’s Moderate Realism. The essay 
also explores the merits and shortcomings of both theories.
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Possible Worlds
1 Introduction
Necessity, possibility and contingency are modal concepts, having to do 
with the mode of truth of propositions. There are thought to be dif-
ferent kinds of necessity, examples being metaphysical necessity (pos-
sibility and contingency), physical necessity and moral necessity. To 
give some examples, it is usually thought that the laws of physics are 
physically necessary. However, arguably, it is physically contingent 
that there is an element with atomic number 116, and physically pos-
sible for there to be an element with atomic number 200. Possible 
worlds talk has been taken to help understand talk of necessity and 
possibility. At the core of such elucidation lies the following princi-
ple:
P-W Link It is (X-)possible that φ if and only if there is a (X-)pos-
sible world w such that, at w, φ.1
In general, the X-possible worlds are subsets of all the possible 
worlds. For instance, it is physically possible that φ if and only if there 
is a physically possible world w such that, at w, φ, and it is morally pos-
sible that φ if and only if there is a morally possible world w such that, 
at w, φ. Metaphysical possibility is understood as being the broadest 
kind of possibility, in the sense that a sentence is metaphysically pos-
sible just in case it is true at some possible world.2 Usually, a world 
is taken to be physically possible if and only if it is a world where the 
1 The corresponding principles for necessity and contingency are:
N-W Link It is (X-)necessary that φ if and only if every X-possible world w 
is such that, at w, φ.
C-W Link It is (X-)contingent that φ if and only if, at w@, φ, and it is not the 
case that every X-possible world w is such that, at w, φ (where w@ denotes the actual 
world).
2 More precisely, to use a distinction presented by Rayo (2013: section 2.2), 
metaphysical possibility is understood to be the broadest kind of possibility de 
mundo, i.e., possibility “sensitive to ways for the world to be” (Rayo 2013: 49), as op-
posed to possibility de repraesentatione, a kind of possibility sensitive to how ways for 
the world to be are themselves represented.
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laws of physics obtain. Arguably, a world is morally possible if and only 
if it is one where all agents are ideally rational. As an example of an 
application of the P-W link, the principle yields the equivalence of 
the two following statements:
(1)   a. It is metaphysically possible that some chair is broken.
b. There is a possible world w such that, at w, some chair 
is broken.
The P-W link helps elucidate talk of necessity and possibility in at 
least two ways. On the one hand, resorting to the P-W link makes it 
easier to capture relations between possibilities, thus providing the 
resources for understanding what is the logic of necessity and pos-
sibility. On the other hand, appealing to the P-W link is sometimes 
helpful in determining the plausibility of some possibility claims.3 
Concerning the logic of necessity and possibility, the P-W link pro-
vides both i) the means to capture the interaction between differ-
ent kinds of possibility, and ii) the means to account for the logic 
of these different kinds. For instance, in connection with the first 
point, we have that if something is physically or morally possible 
(and, in general, X-possible) then it is metaphysically possible, since 
to be a possible world is to be a metaphysically possible world. And 
in connection to with the second point, note that, in general, from 
there being a possible world w such that, at w, some chair is broken 
and every glass is empty, it follows that there are possible worlds w 
and w´ such that, at w, some chair is broken, and, at w ,´ every glass 
is empty. In general, from there being a possible world w such that, 
at w, φ ∧ ψ it follows that there are possible worlds w and w´ such 
that, at w, φ, and, at w ,´ ψ. Given the P-W link, this means that ⬦(φ ∧ ψ) ⊢ ⬦φ ∧ ⬦ψ. In effect, the P-W link underlies the usual 
interpretation of the model-theory for modal logic provided in terms 
of Kripke frames, and thus plays a major role in our understanding of 
the logic of modality, allowing for the model-theory of modal logic 
to be provided in terms of the extensional language of set-theory.4 
3 See Stalnaker (2011: section 2).
4 Kripke first provides what has come to be called the possible worlds semantics 
for modal logic in Kripke 1959, 1963.
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Kripke frames have themselves been applied in fields such as seman-
tics, pragmatics, and game theory, bringing with them talk of possi-
ble worlds. As to the second reason why the P-W link helps elucidate 
talk of necessity and possibility, by attempting to describe in more 
detail a possible world witnessing a possibility claim, one may find 
that the description turns out to be absurd, in which case the possi-
bility claim is false, contrary to what might have been thought before 
trying to provide a description of the possible world witnessing the 
possibility claim.
But should one believe in the existence of possible worlds? And, if 
so, what kinds of things are they? In this article only the second ques-
tion is dealt with. Realism about possible worlds will be presupposed, 
where this is the thesis that there are several possible worlds, among 
which is the actual world. As to the question what kinds of things 
are possible worlds, it will be assumed that any theory answering 
this question should have as a consequence that every instance of the 
P-W link is true. Thus, asking for what kinds of things are possible 
worlds may be seen as asking what kinds of things realise a certain 
theoretical role, partially determined by the P-W link.
Views on the nature of possible worlds can be distinguished ac-
cording to whether they take possible worlds to be actual or nonac-
tual (except for the actual world), and abstract or concrete.5 Two of 
the most popular views on possible worlds occupy two extremes. 
According to Extreme Realism possible worlds are concrete enti-
ties which, apart from the actual world, are nonactual, whereas 
Moderate Realism holds that possible worlds are abstract entities, 
all of which are actual. In this article the focus will be on Extreme 
Realism and Moderate Realism, more precisely on Lewis’s version 
5 Instead of ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’, in the present context terms that 
would best capture the distinction being made would be ‘individualism’ (or 
‘first-orderism’), and ‘higher-orderism’, propositions, properties and relations 
all being examples of abstract entities, and things such as Cristiano Ronaldo, the 
number two and the set of all footballers all being examples of concrete entities. In 
particular, I do not have in mind any of the following distinctions: sets vs. nonsets, 
spatiotemporally located vs. not spatiotemporally located, well defined criteria of 
identity vs. not well defined criteria of identity.
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of Extreme Realism, and Plantinga’s and Stalnaker’s versions of 
Moderate Realism.6
2 Lewis’s Extreme Realism
According to Lewis’s Extreme Realism ours is not the only universe. 
There are several others just as our own, having things as parts just as 
we are parts of this universe. Furthermore, Lewis holds that possible 
worlds are these total universes. That is, more precisely, Lewis holds 
the following thesis on the nature of possible worlds:
Concrete Worlds To be a possible world w just is to be a con-
crete7 individual w such that if any part y of w bears a spatiotem-
poral relation to some object x, then x is part of w, and every two 
parts of w are spatiotemporally related (see Lewis (1986: 70-72)).
A first consequence of Lewis’s account of the nature of possible 
worlds is that possible worlds do not overlap, assuming that being spa-
tiotemporally related to is an euclidean relation.8 To see this assume, for 
reductio, that there are two distinct but overlapping possible worlds 
6 An important view on the nature of possible worlds that will be left out is 
Combinatorialism. The distinctive feature of the view is that to be a possible world 
just is to be sort of rearrangement or recombination. Apart from this claim, the-
orists differ on the nature of the recombinations, in particular on whether such 
recombinations are abstract or concrete. One of the most fully developed com-
binatorialist theories of modality is that of Armstrong 1986, 1989. Armstrong 
holds that facts are what there fundamentally is, and that individuals and relations are 
abstracted from these. These individuals and properties may be recombined in order 
to form “fact-like” entities which, contrary to facts, need not be true. According 
to Armstrong, states of affairs are these “fact-like” entities. Each possible world is 
taken to be a conjunction of states of affairs, and the actual world is the conjunc-
tion of all facts.
7 Even though Lewis is not totally clear on what is meant by saying that pos-
sible worlds are concrete or abstract. Still, Lewis’s views on possible worlds 
entail that possible worlds are concrete on all of the ways in which he precisifies 
concreteness. See Lewis (1986: 81-82).
8 See Lewis (1986: 208-209), Menzel (2013: fn. 6). The notion of overlap 
being used in the text is of a mereological nature: two objects overlap if and only 
if they have a part in common. A relation is Euclidean if and only if, for every x, y 
and z, if x bears the relation to y and to z, then y bears the relation to z.
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w1 and w2. Since the worlds are distinct, there are parts x1 of w1 and x2 
of w2 such that x1 and x2 are not spatiotemporally related. Let r be an 
overlapping part of w1 and w2. Since w1 and w2 are Lewisian worlds, 
r is spatiotemporally related both to x1 and x2. And since being spati-
otemporally related to is assumed to be an euclidean relation, it follows 
that x1 and x2 are spatiotemporally related. Contradiction. Hence, 
it is not the case that there are two distinct but overlapping worlds, 
contrary to the assumption.
Among the theses contained in Lewis’s Extreme Realism is a 
principle of recombination, meant to capture in a non-trivial way 
the claim that for every way a world could have been there is some 
world that is that way. The principle is as follows:
Principle of Recombination
1. For every set of objects there is a world that contains any 
number of duplicates of the objects in the set, in any spati-
otemporal arrangement, size and shape permitting;
2. For every world w and set X of parts of w, there is a possible 
world w´ such that w´ is composed of duplicates of every ele-
ment of X and for any x such that x is a part of w, if there is 
a duplicate of x that is a part of w ,´ then x is a part of some 
element of X.9
For an illustration of how the Principle of Recombination is sup-
posed to work, consider the Eiffel Tower and some merely possible 
architectural landmark y. According to the first thesis of the princi-
ple of recombination, there is a possible world having duplicates of 
both the Eiffel Tower and y. According to the second thesis, there 
will be a possible world having the bottom half, but not the top half, 
of the Eiffel Tower, and there is a possible world world having the top 
half, but not the bottom half, of the Eiffel Tower.10
A different component of Lewis’s Extreme Realism concerns the 
9 Lewis takes x and y to be duplicates if and only if every perfectly natural 
property had by x is also had by y, and vice-versa.
10 For more on the principle of recombination, see Lewis (1986: 87-90), as 
well as Efird and Stoneham 2008 and Nolan 1996.
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notion of actuality. According to Lewis, there are possible worlds 
and parts of these that do not actually exist. In effect, Lewis holds an 
indexical theory of actuality. On his view ‘actual’ behaves semanti-
cally as expressions such as ‘here’ and ‘now’. These are indexical ex-
pressions whose extension is determined by the context of utterance. 
Lewis takes the extension of ‘actual’ to be, relative to a context of 
utterance, the same as the extension of ‘this-worldy’, namely, a prop-
erty that holds of an object x just in case x is a part of the world in 
which the utterance of ‘actual’ takes place.11 Hence, the actual world 
is the maximal sum of spatiotemporally related objects of which I am 
a part. Still, inhabitants of other worlds would be as right in calling 
their worlds ‘actual’ as I am in calling my world ‘actual’, even though 
I would not be right in calling their worlds ‘actual’, and they would 
not be right in calling my world ‘actual’ (just as John and Mary are 
both right in saying ‘I am here now’, even though John would not be 
right in saying that he was in the place where Mary was at the time at 
which she uttered ‘I am here now’, and Mary would not be right in 
saying that she was in the place where John was at the time at which 
she uttered ‘I am here now’).
2.1 A metaphysician’s paradise: two arguments for Extreme Realism
Two main arguments by Lewis for Extreme Realism may be distin-
guished, the argument from familiarity and the argument from theo-
retical utility. The argument from familiarity is as follows:
I believe, and so do you, that things could have been different in count-
less ways. (...) Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are 
many ways things could have been besides the way they actually are. 
On the face of it, this sentence is an existential quantification. It says 
that there exist many entities of a certain  description, to wit “ways 
things could have been”. I believe that things could have been different 
in countless ways; I believe permissible paraphrases of what I believe; 
taking the paraphrase at face value, I therefore believe in the existence 
of entities that might be called “ways things could have been”. I prefer 
11 See Lewis 1970, (1986: 92-96). Note that Lewis allows for ‘actual’ to be 
used more broadly in some contexts, applying also to things that are not part of 
the world where the utterance of ‘actual’ takes place. For instance, in a broader 
sense of ‘actual’ he allows for the actuality of sets whose members are parts of the 
world where the utterance of ‘actual’ took place.
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to call them ‘possible worlds’ (Lewis 1973: 84).
As Stalnaker mentions when discussing Lewis’s argument, the argu-
ment’s rhetorical force lies in making plausible the view that “what 
appears to be a weighty metaphysical theory is really just some or-
dinary belief by another name” (1976: 66). Lewis does acknowledge 
that we sometimes justifiably refrain from taking ordinary language 
sentences at face value. Still, he endorses the view that there is a 
presumption in favour of taking them at face value. We may justifi-
ably refrain from doing so when this leads to trouble and the trouble 
could be avoided by taking them in some different way. In such case, 
the presumption is defeated. But since, according to him, no argu-
ment has successfully shown that Extreme Realism leads to trouble 
(and furthermore he takes every other alternative to lead into trou-
ble), the upshot is that we should not be suspicious of our “ordinary 
belief” in the existence of concrete possible worlds.
The argument from theoretical utility starts with an analogy with 
the case of set theory. Talk of sets provides the means to reduce 
all mathematical vocabulary to just the language of first-order logic 
with identity and membership as its only extra primitives. Likewise, 
Lewis shows how modal talk, talk of mental content, of semantic val-
ues and of properties and relations may all be substituted by talk of 
concrete possible worlds (in conjunction with talk of concrete mere-
ly possible individuals, and talk of sets). Furthermore, the axioms 
of set theory have as consequences all the theorems of mathematics. 
Likewise, he argues that his Extreme Realism has as consequences 
several of the truths involving talk of mental content, properties, se-
mantic values, etc. The hypothesis that there is a hierarchy of sets is 
thus theoretically useful, so much so that mathematicians have been 
led to accept the hypothesis that there are “rather a lot of entities 
unknown to Homo javanensis” (Lewis 1986: 4). Likewise, Lewis holds 
that the hypothesis that there is a plurality of concrete worlds should 
be accepted on the basis of its theoretical utility.
2.2 The reduction of modal discourse
As mentioned, Lewis shows how Extreme Realism offers the re-
sources for reducing modal talk, property talk, etc. to possible 
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worlds talk. Here I will briefly focus on Lewis’s proposed reduction 
of modal talk, more precisely on the reduction of talk of necessity 
and possibility. Lewis takes the P-W link to provide an analysis of 
possibility.12 According to him, the expression ‘at w’, in ‘at w, φ’, 
works as a restricting modifier, restricting the scope of the quanti-
fiers present in φ to things that are parts of w. Thus, ‘at w’ works in 
a way similar to ‘in Australia’ when it occurs in sentences such as 
‘in Australia, every philosopher is a metaphysician’. An interesting 
question concerns what happens when there are no quantifiers in φ. 
That is, how is de re modality analysed, where a de re modal claim 
consists, roughly, in the attribution of a modal property to an indi-
vidual? Consider the following statement:
(2)  It is possible that Ryan Giggs wins the Ballon D’Or.
Statement (2) is analysed as
(3)  There is a possible world w such that, at w, Ryan Giggs wins 
the Ballon D’Or.
Let us assume that it is not the case that Ryan Giggs wins the Bal-
lon D’Or in the actual world. Still, (2) seems to be a true possibility 
statement. Thus, there must be some possible world w different from 
the actual world such that, at w, Ryan Giggs wins the Ballon D’Or, 
or else (3) does not consist in an analysis of (2). Ryan Giggs does not 
exist at w, since, as previously mentioned, Lewis holds that possible 
worlds do not overlap, and Ryan Giggs is an inhabitant of the actual 
world.13 The question is thus how can it be true, at w, that Ryan 
Giggs wins the Ballon D’Or, since Ryan Giggs does not exist at w. As 
Lewis puts it, Giggs must satisfy ‘wins the Ballon D’Or in 2013’ at 
world w in absentia.
Lewis takes satisfaction in absentia to be vicarious satisfaction, 
holding the view that just as “other worlds are alternative possibilities 
for an entire world, so the parts of other worlds are alternative pos-
sibilities for lesser individuals” (Lewis 1986: 8). The idea is that some 
12 Similarly, the N-W link and the C-W link provide analyses of, respectively, 
necessity and contingency (see footnote 1).
13 A different reason why Lewis holds the view that possible worlds do not 
overlap concerns the problem of accidental intrinsics. See Lewis (1986: 199-202).
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individuals in other worlds serve as alternative possibilities for each 
of us. Other worlds “represent”, as Lewis would say, alternatives for 
the actual world, and denizens of other worlds represent alternatives 
for the denizens of the actual world. An alternative possibility for an 
individual x is a counterpart of x. An individual y is a counterpart of an 
individual x just in case y resembles x in a sufficient degree in relevant 
respects, and there is no other individual that is part of the possible 
world of which y is a part that resembles x more than y. What degree 
counts as sufficient and what respects are relevant is taken to be a 
relative and indeterminate matter, subject to contextual variation. 
Now it can be said what it takes for Ryan Giggs to satisfies vicariously 
‘wins the Ballon D’Or’ at a world w. This is the case if and only if 
there is a counterpart of Ryan Giggs that is a part of w and wins the 
Ballon D’Or.14 In general, an atomic formula in the language of first-
order modal logic of the form Pα, where α is an individual constant 
and P is a unary predicate in the language, is satisfied at a possible 
world w if and only if there is a counterpart of α at w that has prop-
erty P at w.15 Since nothing in the actual world is as similar to Ryan 
Giggs as Ryan Giggs himself, what it takes for Ryan Giggs to satisfy 
‘wins the Ballon D’Or’ at the actual world is simply for Ryan Giggs 
to win the Ballon D’Or.
2.3 Is it really a paradise? The argument from familiarity
Stalnaker 1976 and van Inwagen 1986 object to the argument from 
familiarity by noting that from the innocent equation of possible 
worlds with ways things could have been it does not follow that pos-
sible worlds are mereological sums of spatio-temporally related ob-
jects. To assume so is to confuse between objects and the ways these 
objects are. To be a way an object is is to be a property or a state of 
the object, not the object itself. That is, from the equation of pos-
14 Lewis 1968 provides a different account of how modal operators work. 
Lewis notes that the two accounts yield the same results in Lewis (1986: 10).
15 More generally, an atomic formula of the form Rα ⃗ where α ⃗ is a sequence of 
individual constants α1, . . ., αn and R is an n-ary relation, is satisfied at a possible 
world w if and only if there is a counterpart n-ary sequence of α ⃗ such that the ele-
ments in the sequence stand in the relation R. See Lewis (1983: 44).
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sible worlds with ways things could have been it follows that possible 
worlds are properties or states of things, not that possible worlds are 
things themselves. Thus, Lewis’s argument from familiarity does not 
succeed in showing that possible worlds are maximal sums of spatio-
temporally interrelated objects.
Lewis briefly addresses this objection in Lewis (1986: 87, fn. 57). 
He argues that Stalnaker and van Inwagen’s argument establishes that 
possible worlds should be equated with unit sets of maximal sums 
of spatio-temporally interrelated objects, instead of being equated 
with the maximal sums themselves, given his nominalistic account 
of properties as sets of (actual as well as merely possible) individuals. 
But he sees this as a point “of the utmost unimportance, on a par with 
the arbitrary choice between speaking of a set or its characteristic 
function.”
Lewis’s dismissal of Stalnaker and van Inwagen’s objection is, ar-
guably, too quick. The argument from familiarity does a formidable 
job as a defence of realism about possible worlds. But what is at stake 
is whether the argument does a good job as a defence of Extreme 
Realism, a theory that is committed not only to the existence of 
possible worlds, but also to the claim that these are maximal sums of 
spatio-temporally related individuals. One of the main reasons why 
Extreme Realism is found to be suspect concerns the fact that the 
thesis that there is a plurality of maximal sums of spatio-temporally 
interrelated objects – with, for instance, the consequence that there 
are things such as talking donkeys –, is found by many philosophers 
to be simply implausible. If the argument from familiarity were suc-
cessful, then Lewis would have a good case for the thesis that the 
belief that there is a plurality of maximal sums of spatio-temporal-
ly interrelated objects is, despite appearances, an ordinary belief, 
shared by philosophers and non-philosophers alike. That is, Lewis 
would have shown that there is no good reason for meeting Extreme 
Realism with an incredulous stare. What Stalnaker and van Inwagen’s 
reply shows is that, by itself, the argument from familiarity does not 
establish that possible worlds are mereological sums of spatio-tempo-
rally related objects, nor that they are unit sets of mereological sums 
of spatio-temporally related objects, since such conclusion relies on 
an independent argument for the thesis that ways things could have 
been are to be identified with unit sets of maximal sums of spatio-
Online Companion to Problems in Analytic Philosophy 2013 Edition
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temporally related objects. Hence, the argument from familiarity 
does not establish the truth of Extreme Realism. Lewis still needs to 
take seriously the incredulous stare.
This being said, Lewis believes he has an independent argument 
for the equation of ways things could have been with sets of maximal 
sums of spatiotemporally related objects, namely, the argument from 
theoretical utility. If the argument is successful, then properties and 
states are nothing but certain set-theoretic constructions from indi-
viduals. In particular, ways things could have been are nothing but 
singleton sets of maximal sums of spatio-temporally related objects. 
In general, properties and states turn out to be primitives not re-
quired by our total theory. Hence, the question is whether Lewis’s 
argument from theoretical utility is successful.
2.4 Is it really a paradise? The argument from theoretical utility
As previously discussed, the argument from theoretical utility pur-
ports to show that Lewis’s Extreme Realism is a theory with an 
enormous explanatory power, so much so that the price of having a 
profligate ontology is one worth paying. Objections to the argument 
from theoretical utility come in three kinds. They either intend to 
show that a) Lewis’s Extreme Realism is incoherent, and thus cannot 
serve as the basis of a reduction of some notions to others, or that, 
even though the theory is coherent, b) it does not provide an appro-
priate reduction of at least some of the notions in question, or that 
even though Extreme Realism is a coherent theory, and the reduc-
tions do seem to work, c) this does not suffice to show that the price 
of endorsing a plurality of concrete worlds is worth paying. Here I 
will focus solely on the objections having to do with the charge that 
Extreme Realism does not afford a proper reduction of the relevant 
notions, in particular of modal talk.16
16 Lewis discusses two objections to the effect that Extreme Realism is inco-
herent in Lewis (1986: sections 2.2 and 2.3), providing what seem to be satis-
factory replies to both of them. One objection to the effect that the price is not 
worth paying is what Lewis has dubbed “the incredulous stare”. See Lewis (1986: 
section 2.8).
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2.4.1 The possibility of island universes, and of nothing
One reason for endorsing the view that Extreme Realism does not 
provide an appropriate reduction of modality has to do with the pos-
sibility of “island universes”. That is, it seems that there could have 
been disconnected spacetimes. However, if this is so, Lewis’s reduc-
tive account of modality is wrong, for it is not the case that there is 
a possible world – i.e., a maximal sum of spatiotemporally related 
objects – that has disconnected spacetimes. Similarly, it seems plau-
sible to assume that there could have been nothing. Again, Lewis’s 
Extreme Realism rules out this possibility, since possible worlds are 
mereological sums, and thus are composed of at least one object.
Lewis acknowledges that the hypotheses that there could have 
been nothing and that there could have been disconnected space-
times are incompatible with his Extreme Realism. However, he 
does not think that these hypotheses constitute a “central part of our 
modal thinking” (Lewis 1986: 71-72). Thus, he rejects the truth of 
the hypotheses in favour of his theory of possible worlds. Further-
more, he shows that statements akin to these hypotheses are compat-
ible with Extreme Realism. For instance, even though the possibility 
of nothing is excluded, the hypothesis that there could have been 
empty spacetime is compatible with Extreme Realism. Similarly, 
the hypothesis that there could have been universes with little or no 
causation between them is compatible with Extreme Realism. Thus, 
Lewis concludes, even though the hypotheses that there could have 
been nothing and that there could have been disconnected space-
times are incompatible with his Extreme Realism, statements quite 
close to them are compatible with the theory.
2.4.2 Charge of circularity
Shalkowski 1994 argues that Lewis’s theory does not provide an ap-
propriate reduction of modality, the reason being that Lewis’s prin-
ciple of recombination is too weak to guarantee that the following 
claim holds (as acknowledged by Lewis himself (see Lewis 1986: 92)):
Plenitude  For every way things could have been there is a maxi-
mal sum of spatio-temporally related objects, and vice-versa.
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Hence, Shalkowski’s argument goes, the only way to enforce 
the truth of Plenitude is by adding it by hand to Lewis’s Extreme 
Realism. But this makes Lewis’s theory circular – or, perhaps better 
stated, non-reductive – since Lewis would have to appeal to modal 
notions in order to provide an account of the space of possibilities.
Sider 2003 gives the following reply to Shalkowski’s argument. 
He asks us to assume that it is indeed the case that for every way 
things could have been there is a maximal sum of spatio-temporally 
related objects, and vice-versa. In such case, modal statements are 
indeed true if and only if the corresponding statements about pos-
sible worlds are. Furthermore, the analysans contains no modal ex-
pressions. Hence, Lewis’s analysis of modality is not circular, pace 
Shalkowski, provided that it is indeed the case that for every way 
things could have been there is a maximal sum of spatio-temporally 
related objects, and vice versa. As it stands, Sider’s reply seems ap-
propriate. However, in section four I will put forward an objection 
to Extreme Realism that is quite connected to Shalkowski’s and 
which, I believe, stands.
2.4.3 The Humphrey objection
Kripke argues that Lewis’s analysis of de re modality is wrong. He 
asks us to consider the state of Humphrey, a candidate to the presi-
dency of the United States who lost the election to Richard Nixon in 
1972, stating that:
Thus if we say ‘Humphrey might have won the election (if only he had 
done such-and-such), we are not talking about something that might 
have happened to Humphrey but to someone else, a “counterpart”.’ 
Probably, however, Humphrey could not care less whether someone 
else, no matter how much resembling him, would have been victori-
ous in another possible world. Thus, Lewis’s view seems to me even 
more bizarre than the usual notions of transworld identification that it 
replaces (Kripke 1980: 45, footnote 13).
Following Sider 2006, one way of understanding Kripke’s objec-
tion is as follows: since Humphrey has different attitudes towards 
the proposition that Humphrey could have won the election and the 
proposition that there is a counterpart of Humphrey that wins the 
election in some other concrete possible world, it is not the case that 
these are one and the same proposition. Hence, Lewis’s analysis of 
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modality does not work.
Sider replies on behalf of Lewis that it does not follow that the 
propositions are different, since different propositional attitudes 
may be taken towards one and the same proposition under different 
descriptions of the proposition (Sider 2006). To take an example 
of Kripke’s, Pierre may both believe and disbelieve that London is 
pretty under the descriptions, respectively ‘Londres est jolie’ and 
‘London is pretty’ (Kripke 1979). But this need not mean that Pierre 
believes one proposition and disbelieves a different one.
Sider’s reply seems to be on the right track, even though one 
should proceed more cautiously. Cases such as that of Pierre’s are 
quite tricky. Perhaps they show that Pierre has different beliefs to-
wards the same proposition under different descriptions of the prop-
osition. Perhaps they show instead that belief reports fail to track the 
beliefs themselves, and it is indeed the case that Pierre believes one 
proposition and disbelieves another one, even though both ‘Londres 
est Jolie’ and ‘London is pretty’ have as semantic values the same 
proposition (in which case Pierre may even fail both to believe the 
proposition that London is pretty and to disbelieve the proposition 
that London is pretty). Perhaps what is believed are not propositions 
but instead entities like Fregean senses, in which case it is plausible to 
assume that Pierre believes different Fregean senses that determine 
the same proposition. In any case, what I take to be the main point 
in Sider’s reply is the observation that analyses often generate Frege 
puzzles. Hence, the fact that Kripke has found a Frege puzzle con-
cerning Lewis’s analysis of de re modality is not surprising. Nonethe-
less, this does not give us more reason to reject Lewis’s analysis of de 
re modality than any other proposed analysis. Thus, the Humphrey 
objection is not successful. This point seems right.
2.4.4 The necessity of existence
Consider the statement
(4)  Everything necessarily exists.
Lewis’s analysis of de re modality has the effect that (4) is equivalent to
(5)  For every object x in the actual world, for every possible 
world w, every counterpart y of x in w is in w.
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Since (5) is trivially true, the proposed analysis of de re modality leads 
to the result that (4) is also true. But (4) is widely regarded as false. 
Hence, Lewis’s account of de re modality is flawed.
Lewis identifies several possible diagnoses. On the one hand, per-
haps satisfaction in absentia at worlds requires different things to be 
the case depending on the formulae in question. That is, perhaps in 
order for an object to satisfy ‘x is something’ at a world it is required 
that there be a counterpart of the object in the world, while satis-
fying ‘x is a man’ at a world requires that every counterpart of the 
object in that world be a man. On the other hand, perhaps the modal 
language just is ambiguous, (4) being ambiguous between (5) and
(6)  For every object x in the actual world, for every possible 
world w there is a counterpart y of x in w.
These diagnoses lead Lewis to downplay the objection:
What is the correct counterpart-theoretic interpretation of the modal 
formulas of the standard language of quantified modal logic?  – Who 
cares?  We can make them mean whatever we like. We are their mas-
ter.  We needn’t be faithful to the meanings we learned  at mother’s 
knee – because we didn’t.  If this language of boxes and diamonds 
proves to be a clumsy instrument for talking about matters of essence 
and potentiality, let it go hang (Lewis 1986: 12).
What seems to matter is that, whatever is the context in question, 
one can always find an appropriate translation of modal talk into pos-
sible worlds talk. Thus, according to Lewis what is defective is the 
modal language itself, not talk of concrete possible worlds. When 
there is the risk of the modal talk being, for instance, ambiguous, 
what one should do is use possible worlds talk directly, without talk 
of “boxes and diamonds” as a middle man.
3 Moderate Realism
A different view on the nature of possible worlds is provided by 
Moderate Realism. Moderate realists hold the view that possible 
worlds are abstract entities, things like properties, propositions or 
states of affairs, for which there is a distinction between existence 
and being realised/being true/obtaining. In what follows the focus 
will be on Plantinga’s 1974, 1976 and Stalnaker’s 1976, 2012 theo-
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ries of possible worlds. The two theories are quite close, even though 
they also differ in important respects, as shall be seen.
Plantinga holds that possible worlds are states of affairs, where-
as Stalnaker holds that possible worlds are propositions. Plantinga 
(1976: 145) also remarks that one may wonder whether states of af-
fairs just are propositions, and thinks that what he says in his theory 
will hold even if this equation holds. Hence, in what follows I will 
talk just in terms of propositions. Say that a proposition P includes a 
proposition P´ if and only if necessarily, if P is true then P´ is true, 
and that a proposition precludes a proposition P´ if and only if nec-
essarily it is not the case that if P is true then P´ is true. For in-
stance, the proposition that Cristiano Ronaldo is the best footballer 
in the world and plays in Real Madrid includes the proposition that 
Cristiano Ronaldo is the best footbller in the world, and each of these 
propositions preclude the proposition that Cristiano Ronaldo is not 
the best footballer in the world. Finally, say that a proposition P is 
maximal if and only if, for every proposition P ,´ P either includes of 
precludes P .´ Plantinga holds the following view on the nature of 
possible worlds:
Plantinga’s Worlds  To be a possible world just is to be a maxi-
mal and possibly true proposition.
Stalnaker’s account of possible worlds is quite similar. Say that a 
proposition P is maximal* if and only if, for every proposition P ,´ 
either P entails P´ or P entails the contradictory of P .´ He endorses 
the following view on possible worlds:
Stalnaker’s Worlds  To be a possible world just is to be a maxi-
mal* consistent proposition.
This may lead to the thought that the accounts really are the same, 
since it is often assumed that a proposition A entails a proposition B 
if and only if necessarily B is true if A is true. However, this is not 
the case, due to the fact that Plantinga’s and Stalnaker’s underlying 
theories of propositions differ. The difference between the theories 
and the reason why the account of entailment in terms of neces-
sary truth-preservation is rejected by Stalnaker is given in section 
3.4, page 26. For now the focus is on the commonalities between 
Plantinga’s and Stalnaker’s theories of possible worlds.
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As previously seen, Lewis is committed to the idea that there are 
possible worlds that do not actually exist and, more generally, to 
there being mere possibilia (i.e., objects which do not actually exist, 
which for him are parts of nonactual worlds). On the other hand, 
both Plantinga and Stalnaker endorse the view that everything actu-
ally exists. Given their commitment to the existence of many pos-
sible worlds, Plantinga and Stalnaker hold that all of them actually 
exists. But this does not mean that all possible worlds are on a par. 
There is one possible world that is special, in that it is the true maxi-
mal proposition. Sometimes this world is also dubbed the actual world. 
What is important to note is that to say that this proposition is the 
actual world is not say that this proposition is the only possible world 
that actually exists. Moderate realists use ‘actual’ in two different 
senses.
Moderate realists, like Extreme Realists, endorse the P-W link. 
Unsurprisingly, they provide a different interpretation of the ‘at w’ 
phrase occurring in the principle. In the context of the P-W link, ‘at 
w, φ’ means that necessarily, if w is true then it is true that φ.17 For 
instance, (1-a) is equivalent to the statement that there is a possible 
world w such that necessarily if w is true then the proposition that 
there is a broken chair is true.
3.1 The familiarity argument, and no reduction
Interestingly, proponents of Moderate Realism appeal to Lewis’s ar-
gument from familiarity as a defence of their own view. “Ways things 
could have been” are plausibly equated with higher-order entities, 
such as propositions (other candidates being properties and states of 
affairs). For instance, the proposition that Cristiano Ronaldo is not a 
footballer seems to be a candidate for a way things could have been. 
Since possible worlds are “ways things could have been”, it follows 
that the equation of possible worlds with propositions is quite plau-
sible. Hence, Moderate Realism reflects the common sense view on 
the nature of possible worlds.
17 Or, on Stalnaker’s theory, that w entails that φ. In what follows I will be 
speaking in terms of necessary truth-preservation, except when discussing as-
pects specific to Stalnaker’s theory of propositions and possible worlds.
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Even though the argument from familiarity gains cogency when 
used as a defence of Moderate Realism (a cogency it did not enjoy as a 
defence of Extreme Realism) the argument from theoretical utility is 
not so readily available to moderate realists. Sure, the hypothesis that 
possible worlds are propositions may, in the context of a theory of 
propositions, lead to useful theorising. But one of the great theoreti-
cal advantages of Extreme Realism was that it promised to provide 
a reduction of many primitives. Moderate Realism does not offer 
such reductive power. Clearly, Moderate Realism does not provide a 
reduction of talk of propositions. Furthermore, it also does not pro-
vide the resources to reduce modal talk. Since Plantinga explains the 
notions of inclusion and exclusion in terms of the notion of necessity, 
he explicitly appeals to modal talk in his analysis of possible worlds, 
and thus cannot appeal to possible worlds talk as a way to reduce 
modal talk. And even though Stalnaker’s account of possible worlds 
prima facie does not appeal to modal talk, his theory of propositions 
does (see Stalnaker (2012: 27-30)). Hence, Stalnaker’s overall theory 
cannot be taken as providing a reduction of modal talk to non-modal 
talk. Hence, the theoretical virtue of reduction (of modal talk and 
talk of propositions) is one that is not available to moderate realists.
3.2 Objection: Moderate Realism is no theory
Lewis’s first objection to Moderate Realism hinges precisely on the 
fact that the theory does not provide a reductive analysis of modal 
talk and talk of propositions. Insofar as his Extreme Realism ac-
complishes just that, it fares better than Moderate Realism in this 
respect. Lewis acknowledges that this need not be seen as tipping 
the balance in favour of Moderate Realism, given the extreme realist 
commitment to queer entities such as flying pigs. But he argues that 
it does indeed tip the balance in favour of his theory once it is appre-
ciated that the moderate realist cannot grasp some of the notions in 
terms of which he formulates his theory.
Lewis’s argument for the latter claim focuses on the “makes-true” 
relation that holds between the universe and a proposition when the 
world makes the proposition true.18 He challenges the moderate re-
18 The use of ‘makes-true’ to designate the relation Lewis is alluding to is 
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alist to at least tell him whether the relation is an internal or an 
external relation, that is, whether the makes-true relation is “deter-
mined by the two intrinsic natures of its two relata (...) Or (...) only 
by the intrinsic nature of the composite of both of them: [proposi-
tion] plus concrete world” (Lewis 1986: 176). As Lewis points out, 
this is not a request for an analysis of the makes-true relation, a re-
quest that the moderate realists would resist to fulfil given their view 
that talk of propositions is not reducible. Instead, it is only a request 
for some characterisation of it. Lewis argues that the relation cannot 
be external. For assume it is external. In such case whether the uni-
verse bears the makes-true relation to a proposition is a matter inde-
pendent of the nature of the proposition, and thus it could have been 
the case that the universe did bear the makes-true relation to the 
proposition, as well as it could have been the case that the universe 
did not bear the makes-true relation to the proposition. But this is 
absurd. Hence, the makes-true relation must be internal. And here 
comes the real problem for the moderate realist. Since the relation 
is an internal one, in order to grasp that the relation holds between a 
proposition and the world  one has to grasp the nature of the proposi-
tion. But this is beyond one’s range of abilities, it seems. The reason 
is that propositions are nonspatiotemporal things, and thus things 
with which there is no causal acquaintance. But how can the nature 
of something be grasped without there being some sort of causal 
acquaintance with it? It seems it cannot. Since the nature of proposi-
tions cannot be grasped, propositions cannot be distinguished from 
one another. But then there is no saying when the makes-true rela-
tion holds between the world and a particular proposition instead 
of any other. And since this is so, the relation itself cannot grasped.
Suppose the moderate realist replies that he can indeed indi-
viduate propositions in such a way that he can then tell when the 
makes-true relation holds between the world and a proposition in-
stead of some other, doing so via descriptions such as the description 
‘the proposition that Cristiano Ronaldo is the best footballer in the 
world’. Lewis argues that this does not work. The reason is that this 
way of individuating propositions implicitly appeals to the makes-
true relation, since the proposition is being specified as the proposi-
taken from van Inwagen 1986.
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tion that is made-true by Cristiano Ronaldo being the best footballer 
in the world. But the fact that one needs to appeal to the makes-true 
relation in order to provide such description makes the description 
unilluminating, since what was being doubted was whether the mod-
erate realist had a grasp of the makes-true relation to begin with.19 If 
one could distinguish between the different propositions in terms of 
their intrinsic properties, then it would not be implausible to claim 
an ability to distinguish between cases where the makes-true rela-
tion holds between the world and a proposition and cases where it 
does not. But the moderate realist seems unable to do so. Hence, 
he does not grasp the makes-true relation, and thus his theory is 
cashed out in terms that he does not understand. Hence, Lewis con-
cludes, moderate realists do not understand ‘makes-true’. But then, 
Moderate Realism is no theory. Note that, prima facie, Lewis does 
not have any similar problem. Since he provides a reductive account 
of propositions, he can distinguish them by talking about the maxi-
mal sums of spatiotemporally related objects that belong to them and 
those that do not. And he can say when the (actual) world makes true 
a proposition. This is the case when the actual world belongs to the 
19 van Inwagen provides the following example illustrating how this reply by 
the moderate realist would not work:
There are exactly ten cherubim. There is a certain internal relation I call ‘ty-
posynthesis’. I cannot define the word ‘typosynthesis’; it is one of my primi-
tives. I know that each human being bears typosynthesis to some but not all 
cherubim, that only human beings bear typosynthesis to anything, and that 
typosynthesis is borne by things only to cherubim. I am absolutely unable to 
make distinctions among cherubim – except by using the term ‘typosynthe-
sis’. I can sometimes refer to individual cherubim or to non-empty proper 
subsets of the set of all cherubim by calling them things like ‘the one cherub 
that all Greeks and all Tasmanians bear typosynthesis to’ or ‘the set of all 
cherubim that any Cartesian dualist bears typosynthesis to’; but unless I use 
the term ‘typosynthesis’, I can single out neither any one of the ten cheru-
bim nor any one of the 1022 one-to-nine-membered sets of cherubim (van 
Inwagen 1986: 206).
As van Inwagen concludes, we seem to be unable to distinguish cherubim 
from another in a way that enables us to apply ‘cherubim’ correctly. And so we 
have no handle on when the relation of typosynthesis holds, in which case we do 
not really understand what is said by using the expression ‘typosynthesis’. Simi-
larly, Lewis argues, for propositions and the makes-true relation.
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set that is identical to the proposition in question.
van Inwagen 1986 replies to Lewis on behalf of Moderate Realism 
not by directly showing a flaw on Lewis’s reasoning, but instead by 
arguing that if Lewis’s argumentative strategy was good, it could be 
turned against Extreme Realism. The argument is thus a tu quoque 
argument. What van Inwagen’s argument purports to show is that 
if the argumentative strategy used by Lewis is good, then it can be 
used to show that we have no grasp of the membership relation. But 
Lewis’s Extreme Realism has membership as one of its primitives. 
Hence, if the argumentative strategy is a good one, then Lewis’s 
Extreme Realism is no theory at all (also, set-theory is not a theory 
at all, which seems to be absurd, in which case it is better to take 
Lewis’s argument as not being cogent, failing to show that the mod-
erate realist does not grasp the makes-true relation). Say that a rela-
tion is range-internal if and only if necessarily, whatever bears it to x 
bears it also to anything having the same intrinsic properties as x. van 
Inwagen shows that if membership is not range-internal, then it must 
be (purely) external, and uses this fact to argue that membership is 
range-internal, since it is not external. For assume for reductio that 
it is purely external. In such case one should conclude that there is 
no necessary connection between a set and its elements since, as van 
Inwagen puts it, “it seems to be one fact that Tom exists and another 
that he enters into a certain external relation with this set and not 
with that. What stops it from going the other way?” (van Inwagen 
1986: 210). Thus, it would not be a necessary fact that a set has 
the elements it has, which is absurd. Hence, membership is a range-
internal relation. But in such case, by reasoning similar to Lewis’s, it 
is plausible to conclude that one cannot understand ‘is a member of’. 
The reason is that in order to be able to tell, for instance, whether 
any x is a member of a set X instead of a set Y one must be able to 
distinguish between the sets with respect to their intrinsic natures. 
But the only way that we seem to be able to do so is by appealing to 
the membership relation, which is exactly the relation whose grasp 
was being called into question. Hence, van Inwagen concludes, ei-
ther something is wrong with Lewis’s argument or set talk should 
be abandoned. Either way, Lewis’s objection does not make Extreme 
Realism more advantageous when compared to Moderate Realism.
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3.3 Objection: iterated modalities and the P-W link
McMichael 1983 provides a powerful objection to Moderate Realism, 
arguing that the position is in conflict with the P-W link, and thus 
that it does not constitute an appropriate theory of possible worlds. 
The conflict can be appreciated by considering some prima facie true 
claims involving iterated modalities, such as
(7)  Cristiano Ronaldo and Mariza could have had an 11th son that 
was a footballer and could have been an hockey player instead.
By the P-W link, we have that (7) holds if and only if
(8)  There is a possible world w such that necessarily, if w is 
true then it is true that there is an x such that x is Cristiano 
Ronaldo and Mariza’s 11th son and x is a footballer, and there 
is a possible world w´ such that necessarily, if w´ is true then 
it is true that x exists and x is an hockey player.
Besides assuming the truth of Moderate Realism, two other assump-
tions of the argument are the truth of both (7) and of (every instance 
of ) the P-W link. A fourth assumption (a quite plausible one) is that 
no actual individual could have been Cristiano Ronaldo and Mariza’s 
11th son. The argument also relies on the notion of a constituent of a 
proposition. The thought is that some but not all propositions have 
constituents. For instance, the proposition that Cristiano Ronaldo 
is the best footballer in the world has Cristiano Ronaldo as a con-
stituent, and the proposition that Cristiano Ronaldo and Mariza have 
an 11th son has both Cristiano Ronaldo and Mariza as constituents, 
whereas the proposition that there are some men has no constituents. 
Two other assumptions of the iterated modalities argument, assump-
tions that appeal to the notion of constituency, are that a) necessarily, 
for every proposition p and individual x, if it is possible that p is true 
and necessarily, if p is true then x exists, then x is a constituent of the 
proposition that p – that is, it is assumed that necessarily any proposi-
tion that strictly implies20 the existence of some x is taken to have x as 
a constituent –, and b) that, for every proposition p, necessarily, for 
20 Where a proposition p strictly implies a proposition q if and only if neces-
sarily, if it is true that p, then it is true that q.
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every x, if x is a constituent of p, then x actually exists. Assumption 
b) can be seen as itself deriving its justification from a more general 
assumption, namely, that propositions ontologically depend on their 
constituents. That is, that necessarily, for every p, necessarily, for 
every x necessarily, if x is a constituent of p then it is not possible 
for p to exist and x fail to exist. The idea is that the constituents of 
propositions function in a manner analogous to the members of sets. 
Just as part of what it is to be a set is to have certain elements, and 
thus sets ontologically depend on their elements, for some proposi-
tions part of what it is to be them is to have certain constituents, and 
thus these propositions ontologically depend on their constituents. 
A final assumption of the argument is that propositions are neces-
sary existents, or more precisely, that necessarily every proposition 
necessarily exists.
Roughly, McMichael’s argument is the following: consider (8). 
Given the assumption that no (actual) thing could have been Cristiano 
Ronaldo and Mariza’s 11th son, from (8) it follows that
(9)  There is a possible world w such that necessarily, if w is true 
then it is true that there is an x such that x does not actually 
exist, and there is a possible world w´ such that necessarily, if 
w´ is true then it is true that x exists.
Furthermore, since w is a possible world, it is possible that w is true, 
and thus
(10)  It is possible that there is an x such that x does not actually 
exist, and there is a possible world w´ such that necessarily, if 
w´ is true then it is true that x exists.
Given the assumption that necessarily every  proposition  necessarily 
exists, from (10) we get that
(11)  There is a possible world w´ such that it is possible that there 
is an x such x does not actually exist, and necessarily, if w´ is 
true then it is true that x exists.
From (11) and the assumption that if a proposition strictly implies 
that an object exists, the object is a constituent of the proposition it 
follows that
(12)  There is a possible world w´ such that it is possible that there 
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is an x such x does not actually exist, and x is a constituent 
of w .´
Finally, from (12) and the assumption that for every proposition p, 
necessarily, for every x, if x is a constituent of p, then x actually exists 
we get that
(13)  There is a possible world w´ such that it is possible that there 
is an x such x does not actually exist, and x actually exists.
But (13) is absurd. Thus, Moderate Realism is not compatible with 
the truth of every instance of the P-W link, and must therefore be 
rejected.21
3.4 McMichael’s objection and the differences between Plantinga’s 
and Stalnaker’s theories
McMichael’s objection to Moderate Realism provides a natural place 
to introduce an important difference between Plantinga’s and Stal-
naker’s theories of propositions. Plantinga holds the following thesis 
about propositions:
Higher-Order Necessitism Necessarily, every proposition, 
property, and n-ary relation necessarily exists.
In particular, Plantinga holds that necessarily, for every object x eve-
ry proposition that may be said to be about x (such as the proposition 
that x exists) necessarily exists and that necessarily every haecceity 
necessarily exists, where an haecceity is a property such that it is pos-
sible that some x instantiates it, and necessarily, if anything instanti-
ates it, that thing is identical to x. An example of an haecceity is the 
property of being identical to Cristiano Ronaldo.
Stalnaker, on the other hand, holds that some propositions, prop-
erties and n-ary relations possibly do not exist, and also that there 
could have been some propositions, properties and n-ary relations 
that actually do not exist. One of the reasons why Stalnaker endorses 
this view has to do with the fact that he endorses the claim that some 
propositions properties and n-ary relations ontologically depend on 
21 For the interested reader, the appendix of McMichael 1983 provides a for-
malisation of the iterated modalities objection.
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contingently existing individuals.22 In particular, Stalnaker would 
reject the necessary existence of several haecceities, one natural can-
didate for being a contingently existing haecceity being the property 
of being identical to Cristiano Ronaldo, for the reason that he en-
dorses the view that those haecceities depend on the individuals that 
they may be said to be haecceities of.
These two views on the modal status of propositions are con-
nected to two different lines of reply to McMichael’s objection.23 
Plantinga’s theory would force him to reject at least one of the fol-
lowing two assumptions,
(14)   a. necessarily, for every proposition p and individual x, if 
it is possible that p is true and necessarily, if p is true 
then x exists, then x is a constituent of the proposition 
that p (that is, it is assumed that necessarily any propo-
sition that strictly implies the existence of some x is 
taken to have x as a constituent);
b. for every proposition p, necessarily, for every x, if x is a 
constituent of p, then x actually exists.
The reason is that (14-a) and (14-b) lead to an inconsistency in con-
22 Even though this is not the only reason why Stalnaker endorses such view. 
See Stalnaker (2012: 53).
23 There is yet another reply to McMichael’s objection that has gained some 
popularity in recent times, which consists in holding that there (actually) is 
an x such that x could have been the 11th son of Cristiano Ronaldo, contrary to 
McMichael’s assumption. This reply is put forward by Linsky and Zalta 1996 and 
Williamson 2013. These philosophers are proponents of Necessitism, the thesis 
that necessarily every object necessarily is something. Necessitism entails that 
every claim of the form ⬦∃xφ is equivalent to a claim of the form ∃x ⬦φ (that 
is, necessitists are committed to the truth of every instance of both the Barcan 
Formula and the Converse Barcan Formula). The thought that some individuals 
exist contingently is accommodated by distinguishing between being concrete or 
abstract and being neither. For instance, when it is held that Cristiano Ronaldo 
could have been nothing, necessitists argue that what is the case is that Cristiano 
Ronaldo could have been nonconcrete (and nonabstract), while still being some-
thing. One of the main reasons why these philosophers advocate Necessitism has 
to do with the fact that the position is compatible with the Simplest Quantified 
Modal Logic. Whether this is enough to vindicate Necessitism is a topic outside 
of the scope of this paper.
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junction with the plausible claim that there could have been an indi-
vidual x and proposition p such that x does not actually exist and p is 
the proposition that x exists. As for Stalnaker, as previously discussed 
he would reject assumption (15)
(15)  Necessarily, every proposition necessarily exists.
Recall the remark that Stalnaker cannot equate the relation of entail-
ment obtaining between propositions with that of necessary truth-
preservation, the upshot being that Plantinga’s and Stalnaker’s ac-
count of the nature of possible worlds are in fact different. The reason 
why entailment cannot be equated with necessary truth-preservation 
is connected to Stalnaker’s rejection of (15). Here are two counter-
examples to the equation, in both directions. Assume, as Stalnaker 
does, that the proposition that Cristiano Ronaldo does not exist 
ontologically depends on the existence of Cristiano Ronaldo. That 
is, assume that it is not possible for the proposition that Cristiano 
Ronaldo does not exist to exist and for Cristiano Ronaldo not to ex-
ist. On the one hand, it is plausible to assume that it is not the case 
that the proposition that Cristiano Ronaldo does not exist entails 
every proposition. For instance, it does not entail the proposition 
that Messi is a footballer. On the other hand, it is impossible for the 
proposition that Cristiano Ronaldo does not exist to be true. The 
reason is that the proposition must exist in order to have the prop-
erty of truth, in which case Cristiano Ronaldo must also exist. Thus, 
necessarily, if the proposition that Cristiano Ronaldo does not exist 
is true, then the proposition that Messi is a footballer is true. Still, 
as assumed, the proposition that Cristiano Ronaldo does not exist 
does not entail that Messi is a footballer. For the other direction, the 
counterexample is Stalnaker’s:
The proposition that no one is immortal entails the proposition that 
it is not the case that Barack Obama is immortal. But if Obama had 
not existed, the proposition that he was (or that he was not) immortal 
would not exist, and so the proposition that it is not the case that he is 
immortal would not be true. But it might still be true, in such a coun-
terfactual situation, that no one was immortal (Stalnaker 2012: 48).
3.4.1 Plantinga’s theory and possible worlds semantics
An important feature of Plantinga’s theory is that the hypothesis 
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that necessarily every proposition, property and n-ary relation nec-
essarily exists (and thus also actually exists), provides the tools for 
a straightforward realist interpretation of the Kripke semantics for 
first-order modal logic, one accommodating the existence of an in-
tended model.
Briefly, Kripke models are quadruples M = ⟨WM , wM , DM , IM⟩, 
where WM is a non-empty set (usually seen as standing for the set of 
all possible worlds), wM ∈ WM (usually regarded as standing for the 
actual world), DM is a function mapping each w ∈ WM to a (possibly 
empty) set DM(w) (seen as standing for the set of individuals that exist 
at world w), with the proviso that  ⋃w∈WM DM(w) is nonempty, and IM 
is an interpretation function mapping each world w and n-ary predi-
cate letter in the language to a set of n-tuples in (DM(w))n and mapping 
each individual constant to an element in ⋃w∈WM DM(w).
The most straightforward interpretation of Kripke semantics (the 
one provided by the parenthesis in the previous paragraph) is possibil-
ist (that is, it is committed to there being objects that do not actually 
exist), provided that the following holds:
(16)   a. There could have been something that does not actually 
exist.
b. ⬦∃x¬@∃y(x = y).
To see this, note that formula (16-b) is true at a model M if and only 
if there is a w ∈ WM and d ∈ DM(w) such that d ∉ DM(wM). But ac-
cording to the straightforward interpretation of the semantics the 
set DM(wM) stands for the set of actual things. That is, according to 
the straightforward interpretation of the semantics the model de-
picts reality as being such that there is an object that is not an ac-
tual object. If it is assumed that there is such a thing as an intended 
model M*, and that if M* is the intended model then, for instance, 
DM*(wM*) really is the set of actually existing things, it then becomes 
even clearer that the most straightforward interpretation of Kripke 
semantics is possibilist.24 The reason is that formula (16-b) can only 
24 The assumption that there is an intended model causes other sorts of prob-
lems, most notably it prima facie entails that there is a set containing everything 
that actually exists, and thus containing every set, which there is not. However, 
note that this problem is different from the one being alluded to in the text. Even 
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be true according to the intended model if there is some w ∈ WM* and 
d ∈ DM*(wM*), which would be taken as implying that there is some-
thing that does not actually exist. But this is contrary to Actualism, 
the thesis that everything actually exists. However, Plantinga and 
Stalnaker are actualists. They both accept the truth of (16-b). Thus 
the most straightforward interpretation of Kripke semantics is avail-
able neither to Plantinga nor to Stalnaker.
Plantinga’s theory (and in particular his commitment to the thesis 
that necessarily every haecceity necessarily exists) provides the re-
sources for an actualist interpretation of Kripke semantics. Plantinga 
takes the intended model to be a model M* where WM* is the set of 
all maximal and possibly true propositions (i.e., of possible worlds), 
wM* is the true possible world, DM* is a function mapping each world 
w to the set of all haecceities X such that it is not possible for w to be 
true and X not to be exemplified, and IM* is such that, for every n-ary 
predicate Pn and world w ∈ WM*, IM*(Pn, w) is the set of all n-tuples 
of haecceities that are coexemplified with Pn at w (i.e., the set of all 
n-tuples of haecceities such that necessarily, if w is true then they are 
coexemplified with Pn), and for every individual constant c, IM*(c) is 
the haecceity of c. A formula such as
(17)  ⬦Bg
where B may be read as the predicate ‘wins the Ballon D’Or’ and g 
the name ‘Ryan Giggs’, is satisfied by the intended model M* if and 
only if there is a possible world w ∈ WM* and haecceity d such that 
d ∈ IM*(B, w), i.e., if there is an haecceity d and possible world w such 
that necessarily, if w is true then B and d are coexemplified.25
Despite the elegance of Plantinga’s theory, McMichael argues 
that it is ultimately flawed, since it relies on the controversial claim 
that things such as haecceities and de re propositions necessarily exist. 
A first reason presented by McMichael in defence of the claim that 
Plantinga’s theory is flawed concerns the intuition that properties 
such as the property of being identical with Cristiano Ronaldo de-
if there was such a set, the most straightforward interpretation of the semantics 
would still be possibilist.
25 For more details on how the actualistic interpretation of Kripke semantics 
provided by Plantinga works, see Jager 1982.
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pend for their existence on the existence of Cristiano Ronaldo (who, 
it is being assumed, exists contingently). A different reason concerns 
the observation that Plantinga’s semantics is isomorphic to Kripke’s. 
Since, “on the face of it”, Kripke semantics is possibilist, this is a 
sign that Plantinga’s semantics is possibilist as well. A variation on 
the same theme is McMichael’s remark that “To introduce primi-
tive properties each of which is specific to some nonactual object 
seems tantamount to acceptance of possibilism” (McMichael 1983: 
61). And lastly, McMichael complains that Plantinga cannot provide 
a single example of an unexemplified essence, nor of any proposi-
tion that could have been a proposition about an actual nonexistent. 
Thus, McMichael holds that Plantinga’s theory of possible worlds and 
its realist account of the semantics of first-order modal logic should 
be rejected. In section 5.1 McMichael’s objections to Plantinga’s the-
ory will be assessed.
3.4.2 Stalnaker’s theory and possible worlds semantics
McMichael’s objections to the necessary existence of de re proposi-
tions and haecceities presuppose that he himself rejects (15). But he 
also argues that the moderate realist is in no position to reject (15). 
The reason, as he puts it, is that rejecting (15) leads to giving up on 
the extensionality afforded by talk of possible worlds,
since it is being claimed that the possible worlds quantifier within the 
context ‘there is a possible world W such that W includes ____’ does 
not have a range identical to that of the quantifier on the outside. That 
is, they don’t both range over some universal set of possible worlds 
(McMichael 1983: 55).
But then, rejecting (15) would lead to the loss of one of the main 
virtues of appealing to possible worlds in theorising. In particular, 
the moderate realist would be forced to adopt a nonrealistic seman-
tics. But this is something which McMichael takes to be unsatisfac-
tory since, on the one hand, “the number of non actual possibles and 
their relationships must be determined” (McMichael 1983: 62), and 
McMichael is not clear how this can be achieved, and on the other 
hand “We will want a method for ‘factoring’ out the artificial as-
pects” of the semantics (McMichael 1983: 63).
Stalnaker argues that moderate realists are not forced to provide 
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a nonrealistic semantics, since they can in fact provide “a method 
for ‘factoring’ out the artificial aspects.” According to him this is 
done by enriching Kripke models with the means for distinguishing 
the elements that are representationally significant from those that 
are merely instrumental. In order to do so it is crucial to be clear 
on what Kripke models are intended to be models of. According to 
Stalnaker,
The whole Kripke model represents not just these properties [the pos-
sible states of the world] but also a structure of relations between these 
properties (the possible states of the world) and between them and 
other things. The points [in a Kripke model, i.e., the elements in WM] 
themselves are not properties – they are points in an abstract space 
that are being used to represent possible states of the world (Stalnaker 
2012: 38).
Besides propositions, Stalnaker takes Kripke models to represent 
properties, relations, and the relations obtaining between proposi-
tions, properties, relations, propositions and properties, proposi-
tions and relations, etc. It is important to note that the notion of 
proposition in which Stalnaker is interested is one according to 
which mutually entailing propositions are identical. This, Stalnaker 
takes it, is a conception of proposition that “all theorists of proposi-
tions can agree about, even if they want to allow, in various differ-
ent ways, for more fine-grained objects that determine propositions 
in this coarse-grained sense” (Stalnaker 2012: 26). Focusing on the 
representation of propositions, Stalnaker takes them (and thus, pos-
sible worlds) to be represented by sets of elements in WM. Recall that 
Lewis also held that possible worlds could be seen as sets of maximal 
sums of spatiotemporally related objects. An interesting feature of 
Stalnaker’s way of representing propositions (falling out of his com-
mitment to the possibility of there being propositions that do not 
actually exist, and there being contingently existing propositions) 
is that whereas for Lewis possible worlds could be seen as singleton 
sets of maximal sums of spatiotemporally related objects, Stalnaker 
allows for sets representing possible worlds to contain more than one 
element in WM.
To see this assume, in Stalnakerian fashion, that necessarily, for 
every individual x that is Cristiano Ronaldo and Mariza’s 11th son, ac-
tually there is no proposition that is the proposition that x is Cristiano 
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Ronaldo and Mariza’s 11th  son, even though there could have been 
such a proposition. Let w be a possible world (i.e., a maximally* 
consistent proposition) that, among others, entails the proposition 
that there is some x such that x is Cristiano Ronaldo and Mariza’s 11th 
son. According to Stalnaker, w is a contingently maximal proposi-
tion. There could have been a proposition w´ such that w would not 
entail w ,´ and this proposition w´ would entail, for some merely pos-
sible x, the proposition that x is Cristiano Ronaldo and Mariza’s 11th 
son. In the model, the proposition w is represented by a set S with 
more than one element in WM, while w ,´ we may assume for the pre-
sent purposes, is represented by a unit set of one of the elements of 
S. As Stalnaker puts it, “Intuitively, one may think of the points as 
representations of possibilities, one of which would be maximal if 
the [maximal* consistent proposition represented by the set of which 
they are members] had been realised” (Stalnaker 2012: 31).
In order to distinguish the elements in a Kripke model that are 
representationally significant from those that are merely instrumen-
tal Stalnaker adds to Kripke models a family of equivalence relations, 
with one equivalence relation for each element in WM. As he puts it,
each point within an equivalence class has exactly the same represen-
tational significance (in the actual world) as every other point within 
its equivalence class. But we need more than one such point in order to 
represent the different possibilities that would exist if that possibility 
were realized (Stalnaker 2012: 32).
Applying Stalnaker’s remarks to the example just discussed, each 
point in the set S has exactly the same representational significance 
as any other point in S, and thus they will all belong to the same 
equivalence class of points determined by the equivalence relation 
annexed to the actual world. But we need the different points to 
represent the fact that, if the possible world represented by w were 
realised, then there would have been different possibilities corre-
sponding to the different individuals that would have been Cristiano 
Ronaldo and Mariza’s 11th son.
Stalnaker therefore holds that Moderate Realism has the resourc-
es to provide a realist interpretation of possible worlds semantics. 
The trick is to be explicit about what the semantics is trying to rep-
resent, and to provide a method for “factoring out” the elements in 
the semantics that are not representationally significant. His meth-
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od is to supplement each Kripke model with a class of equivalence 
relations, every point within an equivalence class generated by an 
equivalence relation being seen as having the same representational 
significance (in the world to which the equivalence class is annexed) 
as any other point in the same equivalence class. As to McMichael’s 
reservations concerning the feasibility of a semantics capturing “the 
number of non actual possibles and their relationships”, Stalnaker is 
somewhat concessive, holding that he only wants the semantics to 
provide as many non-actual possibles as required by the aims leading 
to the construction of the model (see Stalnaker (2012: 42)).
4 Extreme Realism reconsidered
Philosophers are generally suspicious of the hypothesis that there 
are a plurality of concrete universes. Still, showing exactly why one 
should not endorse the truth of the hypothesis is not an easy task. In 
this section I will argue that, pace Lewis, the hypothesis is not theo-
retically useful. I begin by presenting some considerations by Rayo 
(2013: section 5.2.2) to the effect that Lewis’s theory falls short of 
providing a reductive account of modal talk. Later on I will argue 
that the hypothesis that there is a plurality of concrete universes is 
self-defeating, if taken seriously, since doing so requires appealing 
to modal talk and property talk. The upshot is that the hypothesis 
should be abandoned, since the only reason on the table for its adop-
tion was its theoretical utility.
4.1 Lewis’s substantial assumption
As previously mentioned, for Lewis a de re modal claim such as
(3)  There is a possible world w such that, at w, Ryan Giggs wins 
the Ballon D’Or
is true just in case Giggs satisfies vicariously, at w, ‘x wins the Ballon 
D’Or’ (since it is not the case that Giggs actually wins the Ballon 
D’Or), which is the case if and only if there is a counterpart of Giggs 
that is a part of w and wins the Ballon D’Or. Rayo points out that, 
according to Lewis, this is the case if and only if there is some con-
dition ψ that is analysable as a spatio-temporal distribution of per-
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fectly natural properties such that w represents ‘Ryan Giggs wins the 
Ballon D’Or’ only if x satisfies ψ in w. In general, a sentence of the 
form
(18)  ⬦Φα
is true, according to Lewis, if and only if there is a possible world 
w, counterpart x of α and condition Φ* such that x is a part of w and 
satisfies Φ*, where Φ* is analysable as a spatio-temporal distribu-
tion of perfectly natural properties. But, as Rayo notes, it is highly 
doubtful whether there is any theory capable of presenting, for every 
true statement of the form ⬦Φα, a condition Φ* analysable as a 
spatio-temporal distribution of perfectly natural properties such that 
the fact that there is a counterpart of α in some world w which, in 
w, satisfies Φ* represents that, in w, Φα is true. For instance, Φ* 
cannot be a predicate standing for a dispositional property, since a 
dispositional property is one whose exemplification by an individual 
depends on the behaviour of its counterparts. But even the primitive 
vocabulary of physics contains, arguably, expressions that stand for 
dispositional properties. As an example, Rayo mentions the property 
of having mass, since it is plausible to hold that “part of what it is to 
have mass is to be disposed to resist acceleration” (Rayo 2013: 137).
Rayo anticipates a Lewisian objection to the effect that this is at 
most a problem of language, of our current expressive resources, 
not a problem of there being the required perfectly natural prop-
erties to do the job. He replies to the objection by noting that the 
claim that there are such perfectly natural properties to do the job 
is a substantial assumption, one requiring justification. I believe that 
Rayo’s reply is essentially right, and that it puts more pressure on 
the hypothesis that there is a Lewisian pluriverse than it may at first 
appear. To see this, remember that Lewis’s best argument for the ex-
istence of such a pluriverse is the argument from theoretical utility, 
an argument crucially relying on the claim that the hypothesis of a 
Lewisian pluriverse allows the reduction of modal talk and property 
talk. What Rayo shows is that, in general, Lewis has not given us 
such reduction, and that he does not even have available, at least not 
presently, the resources to perform such reduction (since the reduc-
tion would be carried out, plausibly, in a language containing the 
language of physics which, Rayo suggests, is itself couched in modal 
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terms). Hence, Lewis has not succeeded in showing that the hypoth-
esis of a Lewisian pluriverse has the theoretical utility he claims it 
has. But then, there seems to be insufficient justification to believe 
in the hypothesis.
4.2 The hypothesis is self-defeating
Recall Shalkowski’s objection to Lewis to the effect that his the-
ory is circular. I will suggest that the considerations adduced by 
Shalkowski can be used to frame a different objection. The structure 
of the objection is as follows: if the hypothesis that there are several 
maximal sums of spatiotemporally related objects is taken seriously, 
then Lewis’s is not the best theory available. A theory faring bet-
ter than Lewis’s with respect to theoretical utility, providing more 
truths about the Lewisian pluriverse, is obtained by accepting modal 
talk and property talk as primitive. But the only reason for taking 
seriously the hypothesis of a Lewisian pluriverse was the promise 
of reduction. Hence, one does better to dismiss the hypothesis alto-
gether.
As Sider notes, Shalkowski’s charge of circularity is misguid-
ed. But Shalkowski is right in pointing out that Lewis’s principle 
of recombination is too weak to guarantee the intuitive content of 
Plenitude,
Plenitude  For every way things could have been there is a maxi-
mal sum of spatio-temporally related objects, and vice-versa.
This observation invites a different sort of objection to Lewis’s 
Extreme Realism. The idea is that a theory that would have all the 
desirable consequences of Lewis’s theory and would also be able to 
characterise the Lewisian pluriverse would be preferable to Lewisian 
Realism. At first glance, such a theory is immediately available by the 
addition of Plenitude to Lewis’s theory, in which case both modal 
talk and property talk will have to be taken as being primitive. But 
not so. The problem is that Lewis’s reductive analyses enable him 
to get from truths in the language of concrete possible worlds to 
truths stated in a modal language and in a language of properties. But 
this problem is not insurmountable. The trick is to add to this novel 
theory bridge principles connecting statements about the Lewisian 
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pluriverse to statements about modality and properties. One such 
bridge principle will be the P-W link itself, but others will be re-
quired. To give just one example, in order to connect the Lewisian 
pluriverse to the domain of properties, one of the principles that 
would be required would be: ∀Xn, if Xn is a set of n-ary sequences of 
parts of maximal sums of spatiotemporally related individuals, then 
there is a property X´ such that ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(⟨x1, . . . ,xn⟩ ∈ Xn) iff (the 
haecceities of x1, . . . ,xn are coexemplified with X´). I will not here 
provide such a theory, but I hope my remarks have sufficed to give an 
idea of how the theory would look like.
Let me dub this new theory ‘Overkill Realism’. There will be 
truths of Lewis’s Extreme Realism that Overkill Realism will not 
be able to yield. Notable examples will be that to be a property just 
is to be a set of parts of Lewisian universes, and that to be a propo-
sition just is to be a set of Lewisian universes. But this cost does 
not seem to be high, since the theory yields whatever undisputable 
truths involving modal talk and property talk that were yielded by 
Lewis’s Extreme Realism. On the other hand, Plenitude provides 
the means for characterising the Lewisian pluriverse in a way that 
is not available to Lewis, since it is part of his theory that modal 
talk and property talk is not primitive. Furthermore the bridge prin-
ciples can be used to get to truths about properties, propositions, 
modality, etc. via truths about the pluriverse, and vice-versa. Thus, 
Overkill Realism is a theory preferable to Lewis’s Extreme Realism. 
Even though it has higher costs when compared to Extreme Realism 
with respect to ideology, the price seems right given the advantage 
of being able to characterise the Lewisian pluriverse. The rationale 
behind a defence of Overkill Realism as being preferable to Extreme 
Realism is thus a sort of “anti-Razor”: appeal to as many primitives as 
required in order to derive the statements that should count as true 
statements of the theory.
This is a natural place to stop and reconsider Lewis’s original ar-
gument for Extreme Realism. The argument relied on the fact that 
the hypothesis of a Lewisian pluriverse is theoretically useful, since 
it plays an ineliminable role in a theory having fewer primitives than 
the alternatives, and which fares at least as well as other theories on 
offer with respect to their consequences concerning statements about 
mental content, properties, semantic values, etc. whose truth is not 
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in dispute. But since this is so, let us take the hypothesis of a Lewisian 
pluriverse seriously, trying to get to as many truths about it as pos-
sible. Doing so leads to privileging Overkill Realism over Extreme 
Realism, since Overkill Realism comes with a substantive princi-
ple characterising the structure of the plurality of concrete worlds. 
What is important to note at this point is that Overkill Realism re-
quires modal talk and property talk as not being analysable, or in 
any case as not being analysable solely in terms of what is going on 
at Lewisian worlds. This means that if one takes the hypothesis of 
a Lewisian pluriverse seriously, then the conclusion is reached that 
the Lewisian pluriverse does not deliver the means for the promised 
reduction, since characterising the pluriverse would require appeal-
ing to modal talk and property talk anyway. But this shows that the 
only reason for endorsing Extreme Realism is absent once one takes 
the hypothesis of a Lewisian pluriverse seriously. Thus, the theoreti-
cal advantage of Extreme Realism is illusory, disappearing once one 
tries to characterise the Lewisian pluriverse itself. Hence, one does 
better in discarding Extreme Realism altogether. The hypothesis of 
a Lewisian pluriverse will not deliver the goods that were promised 
to us, namely, reduction of modal and property talk. Furthermore, 
it comes with high costs, for instance, the cost of accepting the exist-
ence of talking donkeys.
5 The iterated modalities objection reconsidered
Arguably, the iterated modalities objection is nowadays the most 
pressing challenge to Moderate Realism. In this section I will take 
yet another look at McMichael’s arguments against Plantinga’s strand 
of Moderate Realism, as well as to Stalnaker’s reply to McMichael’s 
objection to his theory. On behalf of Plantinga I will argue that 
McMichael’s arguments do not provide good reasons to believe that 
haecceities exist contingently. As to Stalnaker’s reply to McMichael, 
I will note what I think is a minor difficulty to the Stalnakerian strat-
egy for providing a realist interpretation of Kripke semantics, and 
say why I believe that the difficulty does not undermine Stalnaker’s 
reply to McMichael. The upshot is that McMichael’s objection fails 
to establish the untenability of Moderate Realism.
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5.1 Do propositions and properties exist necessarily?
McMichael’s objections to Plantinga seem less than persuasive. Let 
me start with the claim that Plantinga’s semantics should be taken to 
be possibilist since it is isomorphic to Kripke semantics, a semantics 
which is as McMichael puts it, “on the face of it, a possibilist seman-
tics” (McMichael 1983: 61). A reply to this objection consists in not-
ing that an appeal to the fact that Plantinga’s semantics and Kripke 
semantics are isomorphic does not establish much, since it can be 
used in arguments going in opposite directions. In particular, the 
following reply is available to a proponent of Plantinga’s Moderate 
Realism: since the two semantics are isomorphic, the conclusion to 
take is that, despite appearances, Kripke semantics is in fact actual-
ist, since Plantinga’s semantics is an actualist semantics.
As to the complaint that Plantinga is not able to provide a sin-
gle example of an unexemplified essence, here is an example of an 
unexemplified essence that will work if the thesis of the necessity 
of origins is true: the property of being the human being originat-
ing from the union of egg y and sperm z, assuming that egg y and 
sperm z haven’t actually united. Concerning McMichael’s remarks 
that “To introduce primitive properties each of which is specific to 
some nonactual object seems tantamount to acceptance of possibi-
lism” (McMichael 1983: 61) the only thing to say is that the remark 
by itself does nothing by way of showing that there actually are no 
such properties, and that it is false that to accept their existence is 
tantamount to accepting possibilism: according to Plantinga every 
property necessarily exists, and thus these primitive properties ac-
tually exist. Hence, there is no commitment to there being things 
which do not actually exist. Finally, it seems to me that there is no 
such thing as a robust intuition concerning the necessary or contin-
gent existence of haecceities. The upshot is that the jury is still out 
on the question whether necessarily every property and proposition 
necessarily exists.
5.2 Stalnaker’s realist interpretation of Kripke semantics
Recall Stalnaker’s comment on what gives his version of Kripke se-
mantics its realist bite: “each point within an equivalence class has 
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exactly the same representational significance (in the actual world) 
as every other point within its equivalence class” (Stalnaker 2012: 
32). Usually, the way equivalence relations are thought to “factor 
out” what is representationally significant from what is not is that 
what is representationally significant is what is invariant across the 
different elements in each of the equivalence classes generated by 
the equivalence relation. However, I believe that this story is incom-
plete, at least with respect to finding out which elements of a Kripke 
model are representationally significant.
Suppose that there is one equivalence class generated by the 
equivalence relation attached to wM such that every point in that class 
is a set. Is this fact of any representational significance? Should, for 
instance, the possible world represented by that equivalence class be 
taken to be a set? Arguably not. For a second, perhaps more pressing 
case, suppose that it is not only possible that there is some human 
being x that results from the union of egg y and sperm z that actually 
have not united, but also that necessarily, x results from the union of 
egg y and sperm z. In such case the subset S of elements of WM model-
ling a possible world entailing the proposition that there is a human 
being that results from the union of y and z will be such that there is 
an element x ∈ ⋃w∊WM DM(w) such that x ∉ DM(wM) and x ∈ ⋂w∊S DM(w). 
The presence of this particular element x would be invariant across 
the domains of every world in S. Thus, does S represent a proposition 
that entails that this particular x exists? Arguably not. But then, Stal-
naker’s account of what is representationally significant in a Kripke 
model must be complemented. The equivalence relations proposed 
are not enough.
One plausible strategy would be to assume that facts about propo-
sitions, properties, relations, relations between these, etc. are rep-
resented not by one model, but by a set of them (call it the intended 
set). Again, what would be representationally significant would be 
what was invariant across the intended set. This would, arguably, 
account for the two cases discussed. Only some models M in the in-
tended set would have an equivalence class generated by the equiva-
lence relation annexed to wM such that every element in that class was 
a set. And the models M in the intended set would also differ with 
respect to which element would represent the merely possible x that 
would result from the union of egg y and sperm z. But, this strategy 
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would perhaps not be enough. For instance, it is plausible to assume 
that every model M in the intended set had some w ∈ WM such that 
DM(wM) ⊂ DM(w). The elements in DM(w) − DM(wM) would still actually 
exist according to the moderate realist, since the moderate realist 
holds that everything actually exists. Hence, one invariant feature 
across the models in the intended set would be that some actual 
things are not in DM(wM), the domain of the actual world. But this 
cannot be taken as representing that everything that possibly exists is 
such that it actually exists. Thus, equivalence relations cannot be as-
sumed to do all the job required. What is representationally signifi-
cant in a model cannot be just what is invariant across the different 
elements of an equivalence class, at least if the equivalence classes in 
question are those that have been considered so far.
Even though equivalence relations may not be enough to show 
what is representationally significant in a Kripke model, I believe 
Stalnaker’s overall point, namely, that a realist interpretation of 
Kripke semantics compatible with his moderate realism can be giv-
en, still stands. The main point to take from Stalnaker’s appeal to 
equivalence relations should be that in order for a Kripke model to 
have a realist interpretation, i.e., for it to be a model of modal phe-
nomena, it need not be the case that every element in it is represen-
tationally significant, that it represents every feature of modal reality, 
or even that the model represents, for instance, that something is a 
particular way by really having something that is that way. Further-
more, it does seem that Kripke models afford the means to repre-
sent propositions, properties, relations, relations between these, etc. 
However, the challenge of distinguishing all the representationally 
significant features of a Kripke model from the features that are not 
representationally significant still stands. My guess is that this is not 
only a problem for Stalnakerian moderate realists using Kripke mod-
els, but also for most theorists appealing to modelling techniques in 
their investigations. Arguably, that should not prevent either from 
using modelling techniques in their investigations.
6 Conclusion
Possible worlds talk is nowadays common in philosophy as well as 
in several other areas of inquiry. In this paper I have set myself to 
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present two of the most influential views on the nature of possible 
worlds, as well as the main arguments for and against them.
Firstly, an explanation of why talk of possible worlds is taken to 
be theoretically useful was provided. It was pointed out that, on the 
one hand, such talk illuminates the logic of modality and, on the oth-
er hand, it provides a way to test the tenability of claims about what 
is possible. Afterwards, Lewis’s extremely influential view on the 
nature of possible worlds was presented, as well as the main argu-
ments for and against it. The same was done for Moderate Realism, 
with two strands of the view being distinguished, namely, Plantinga’s 
Moderate Realism and Stalnaker’s Moderate Realism. As shown, one 
of the main differences between these two theories has to do with 
their underlying theory of propositions and other higher-order enti-
ties. While Plantinga holds that necessarily every higher-order entity 
necessarily exists, and in particular that necessarily every haecceity 
necessarily exists, Stalnaker rejects both claims.
Subsequently, critical evaluations of both Extreme and Moderate 
Realism were presented. Concerning Extreme Realism, it was 
shown why there are reasons for scepticism concerning the Extreme 
Realist’s promise of a reduction of modal and property talk, and it 
was argued that taking seriously Lewis’s hypothesis of a multitude 
of concrete universes is, in a sense, self-defeating. As to Moderate 
Realism, it was argued that McMichael’s iterated modalities ob-
jection to the view does not really rule out Plantinga’s Moderate 
Realism, nor Stalnaker’s. Nevertheless, the objection does seem to 
show that there is a lot of work still to be done by Moderate Realists. 
On the one hand, good arguments in support of the hypotheses that 
necessarily every higher-order entity necessarily is something, and 
in particular that necessarily every haecceity necessarily exists, are 
lacking (as are good arguments in support of the negation of these 
hypotheses). On the other hand, Stalnaker has only given a sketch of 
what could be a solution to the problem of providing a realist inter-
pretation of Kripke semantics that is compatible with his strand of 
Moderate Realism.
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